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T
he financial crisis, quite understandably, has moti-
vated a broad re-examination of our approach to
financial regulation. Ideas for regulatory improve-
ments have come from academics, the financial industry,
and  Congress.  Many  commentators  have  argued  that 
regulatory  shortcomings  leading  up  to  the  crisis  were 
the direct result of deregulation implemented over the 
preceding decades. One particular step in this process of
deregulation was the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Glass-Steagall  became  law  in  June  1933  as  part  of  the 
legislative  response  to  the  Great  Depression.  This  law
required that the investment banking activities of under-
writing and dealing in securities could not be conducted in
the same companies as the commercial banking activities of
taking deposits and making loans. The motivation for this
law was a widespread perception that the combination of
those activities had led to conflicts of interest which result-
ed,  for  instance,  in  questionable  securities  being  sold  to
investors so that banks’ borrowers could continue to service
their bank loans. While this separation became weaker over
time, many point to the Financial Services Modernization
Act of 1999, better known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
as the action that “repealed” Glass-Steagall.
The crisis of 2007 and 2008 also involved the interaction
of securities and banking, although in a somewhat different
form. Securities created by pooling loans, particularly mort-
gage-backed securities, were at the heart of the crisis. This
process  of  securitization  includes  activities  that  resemble
both traditional commercial banking (making loans) and tra-
ditional  investment  banking  (underwriting  and  dealing  in
securities). While  many  of  the  riskiest  mortgages  in  the
securitization market were originated by lenders outside the
commercial banking system, the largest commercial banks
still  suffered  significant  losses  on  subprime  loans.  These
banks suffered losses because they had provided implicit or
explicit  commitments  of  liquidity  support  to  off-balance
sheet entities involved in subprime loan securitization.
In retrospect, it has become apparent that this process
led to an overexpansion of risks related to mortgages and
other  lending.  Would  this  expansion  have  been  possible
before the weakening of the separation between investment
and commercial banking? At the time Gramm-Leach-Bliley
was passed, many of the securities activities that were tied
most  closely  to  the  current  financial  crisis  were  already 
permissible for banks and bank-affiliated companies. So, in
this  sense,  the  legislation  did  not  significantly  alter  the 
powers the banks had. Of course, one might respond that
before  Gramm-Leach-Bliley  the  separation  created  by
Glass-Steagall had already been weakened considerably. This
weakening had occurred due to regulators’ rulemakings and
court decisions. As a result, during the 1980s and 1990s com-
mercial  banks  were  offering  many  investment  banking
services and investment banks were offering many commer-
cial banking services. But even so, it was not so much the
mixing of activities that led to the problems in the expan-
sion and management of risk. Rather, it was the ways in
which some large financial firms, whether in commercial or
investment banking, approached their exposures to an event
that, at the time, looked relatively unlikely. 
The securitization of assets like mortgages brings with it
some benefits of risk diversification by bundling the credit
made to a large number of borrowers. The risk that remains
is aggregate, undiversifiable risk, like that associated with a
change in interest rates or a broad decline in the value of real
estate. The  latter,  in  fact,  turned  out  to  be  the  risk  that
imperiled our financial system.
Markets are usually able to allocate large aggregate risks
to those firms best equipped to hold those exposures. One
factor  that  might  give  an  individual  firm  a  comparative
advantage at holding such risks is access to a reliable source
of emergency liquidity. The financial safety net that includes
deposit insurance and access to Fed lending did this by offer-
ing implicit and explicit commitments of liquidity to issuers
of mortgage-backed financial instruments. When the mar-
kets for those instruments turned sour, the risks came back
onto the books of the banks. Investment banks, especially
large firms which may have benefited from a presumption
that they would receive official support in a crisis, may have
similarly been advantaged when holding exposures to seem-
ingly unlikely bad events, such as a decline in home prices. 
This dynamic of aggregate risks being concentrated in
the hands of large institutions is independent of which firms
are allowed to engage in which activities. It comes instead
from  the  way  in  which  emergency  financial  support 
is  provided  by  the  public  sector.  The  existence  of  such 
support  creates  the  need  for  regulatory  oversight  and,  in 
particular, for regulatory attention to aggregate risks that
tend to be concentrated in large institutions, the failure of
which can produce financial panic. 
The  regulatory  agencies  are  undertaking  efforts  to
improve this aspect of oversight, and some components of
reform proposals are aimed at aggregate or systemic risks.
This is an important direction for improvements to take.
Yet,  improvements  to  the  way  we  constrain  the  financial
safety  net  are  needed  too. These  changes  would  make  a
greater  contribution  to  financial  stability  than  rebuilding
the Glass-Steagall wall.  RF
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